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Ethiopia’s economy has been growing at breakneck speed for well over a decade now, earning 
the nickname as Africa’s lion. In recent years, the development literature on Ethiopia has paid 
particular attention to the role of industrial policy, especially the ways in which the Ethiopian 
experience compares to that of the Asian tigers. But through this comparative-historical 
perspective, little attention has been devoted to an important aspect of industrial policy in 
Ethiopia — foreign direct investment (FDI) in the manufacturing sector. This paper compares 
FDI-oriented industrial policy in Ethiopia in the current era (particularly focusing on light 
manufacturing) to that of South Korea and Taiwan between 1960 and 1990, arguably the two 
most generalizable cases among the Asian tigers. The paper argues that FDI-oriented industrial 
policy in Ethiopia seems to be bringing about short-term economic benefits, and is showing 
promise for further industrialisation. At the same time, it could benefit from taking more 
lessons from the long-term economic development perspective that characterised South 
Korea’s and Taiwan’s approach to FDI. Such a long-term perspective most importantly 
includes pro-active strategies to transfer technology from foreign firms to the domestic 
economy and the creation of backward linkages from foreign to domestic firms. 
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Ethiopia’s rapid economic growth over the past decade, the high degree of state intervention 
in the economy, and the state’s focus on industrialisation are prompting comparisons between 
the development regimes of Ethiopia and the Asian tigers1 — four countries in East Asia (Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) that underwent rapid industrialisation and 
maintained exceptionally high growth rates between roughly 1960 and 1990.   
 However, this comparative-historical literature that is emerging on a development and 
industrialisation regime in Ethiopia in the image of the Asian tigers has yet to look at one of 
the most important aspects of Ethiopia’s industrial policy2 — the attraction of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) into the manufacturing sector. Especially in highly prioritised 
manufacturing industries, such as the textile and leather industries, the Ethiopian government 
sees FDI inflows as a crucial way of generating export revenues, absorbing labour, stimulating 
demand for agricultural inputs, and transferring technology to the domestic economy. This is 
why the Ethiopian government has been working relentlessly to attract foreign investors into 
manufacturing: manufacturing FDI in Ethiopia increased from US$570m in 2007/08 to 
US$3,712m in 2016/17.3 
This comparative-historical perspective is important not only because it complements 
the existing comparative-historical literature on development in Ethiopia, but also because it 
complements recent studies on manufacturing FDI in Ethiopia.4 These recent studies have 
paved the way for understanding the role of manufacturing FDI in Ethiopia’s industrialisation. 
However, they fall short in assessing the direction of FDI-oriented industrial policy in Ethiopia, 
most importantly if the current set of policies has the potential of transferring technology from 
foreign firms to the domestic economy and creating backward linkages from foreign to 
domestic firms. Gauging the potential success of FDI-oriented industrial policy measures in 
Ethiopia is obviously challenging because Ethiopia is at a very early stage of industrialisation. 
But a comparative-historical perspective can help us some way in understanding which 
direction the policies are heading, and what is lacking in order for the policies to be potentially 
successful. This paper carries out such an exercise, asking if the ‘African lion’ should learn 
from the ‘Asian tigers’ with respect to FDI-oriented industrial policy. 
Among the Asian tigers, I have chosen South Korea and Taiwan as points of 
comparison for a number of reasons. First, the development literature on Ethiopia suggests that 
they have served as more important sources of inspiration than Hong Kong and Singapore.5 
 3 
Second, South Korea and Taiwan are more generalizable than Hong Kong and Singapore as 
points of reference for today’s least developed countries (and in particular Ethiopia), as the 
latter two are considered more special cases because of their small populations and because 
their development process did not start from an agrarian or raw material base that is typically 
taken to be the starting point for industrialisation. Third, from an emulation standpoint for 
today’s developing countries, looking in particular at South Korea and Taiwan is useful.6 
Throughout the history of capitalism, no countries have grown as rapidly — from low to high-
income — and industrialised as fast as South Korea and Taiwan did from roughly 1960 to 
1990. These two countries are arguably the most successful examples of economic ‘catch-up’.  
The case studies of South Korea and Taiwan in this paper are a synthesis of second-
hand sources (already existing literature). In Ethiopia’s case, FDI-oriented industrial policy in 
the current era is barely covered in the literature. I therefore made four fieldwork trips to 
Ethiopia between April 2015 and February 2018, which together summed up to 7 months. I 
carried out 62 interviews with key officials in the government, private sector (focusing on firms 
in light manufacturing industries7) and private sector associations, mainly to understand the 
government’s motivation behind the FDI-oriented development strategy, the industrial policies 
formulated to support the strategy, and to gauge success of the strategy. The sample size of 
interviews followed a satiation aim for familiarity with the topics of interest to the paper. The 
sample size and the choice of interview subjects also reflected a need for triangulation — 
interviewees were chosen to represent different viewpoints in order to deal with bias due to 
vested interests (e.g. business owners versus government representatives).8  In the private 
sector, I targeted mostly firms in the textile and leather industries, as these are the largest and 
fastest-growing light manufacturing industries in Ethiopia. I interviewed managers and owners 
from 33 firms, including foreign and domestically owned. Interviewees in the government 
apparatus included representatives of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Industry, the 
Industrial Parks Development Corporation, the Ethiopian Investment Commission, the Central 
Statistics Agency, the Ethiopian Inputs Industrial Supply Enterprise, The Leather Industry 
Development Institute, and the Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute. Interviewees 
from private sector associations included representatives of the Ethiopian Chambers of 
Commerce, the Investor’s Association at Hawassa Industrial Park, and one industry association 
that requested full anonymity. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the wider context in which an 
analysis of FDI-oriented industrial policy is important: why do developing countries attract 
FDI as part of an industrialisation strategy, what challenges do developing countries generally 
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face by embarking on such a strategy, and what characterises the successes? Section 3 analyses 
FDI-oriented industrial policy in Ethiopia. Section 4 carries out a similar analysis for South 
Korea and Taiwan. Section 5 draws together the analysis in section 3 and 4 to answer the main 
research question of the paper. 
 
2. FDI-oriented industrial policy in developing countries: a conceptual 
framework in the comparative-historical tradition 
 
After the Asian tigers showcased rapid industrialisation, development economists and political 
economists started devoting a great deal of attention to studying the factors of success for 
industrialisation in East Asia. 
 A perspective that has become influential highlights how successful industrialisation in 
East Asia was contingent on specific features of the state, which later has become known as 
features of ‘developmental states’. In short, this literature attributes the following 
characteristics to the East Asian developmental states: 1) they were states that successfully 
conjoined private ownership with heavy state intervention; 2) although they were states that 
did not gain legitimacy through parliamentary elections (for the most part), they did so through 
their record in economic development; 3) they were states that gave high policy priority to 
economic development: economic development was to be achieved over anything else, and 
this was to be done through industrialisation; 4) they were states that had a professional 
bureaucracy that kept its distance from everyday politics and from the lure of the private sector, 
but at the same time was a partner with the private sector, sharing the goal of industrial 
transformation.9 
 With respect to the policy aspect of industrialisation, Red Cherif and Fuad Hasanov 
highlight three key principles behind the success of the Asian tigers: 1) the support of domestic 
producers in sophisticated industries, beyond the initial comparative advantage; 2) export 
orientation; and 3) the pursuit of fierce competition with strict accountability.10 Point number 
two and three draw on the analysis of some scholars from the developmental state perspective, 
who have highlighted the importance of ‘carrot-and-stick’ policies. For example, Robert Wade 
argues that successful industrial policy in East Asia was not only about specific tools per se 
(like tariffs and subsidies), but the intricate ways the state operated with its array of incentives 
designed to improve the production capacity of firms. For example, in Taiwan, export subsidies 
on manufactured goods were among the highest in the world in the 1960s, but exporting firms 
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also faced stringent local content requirements.11 Similar to Wade, Alice Amsden has argued 
that that industrialisation in East Asia relied on well-crafted reciprocal control mechanisms 
(RCMs). These were methods by which the government would give special favours and 
assistance to firms, often in the form of direct or indirect subsidies, in exchange for meeting 
certain performance targets, such as exporting, local content, or product specifications. For 
example, in South Korea, the licence to establish a general trading company depended on 
meeting export criteria related to value, geographical diversity, and product complexity. 12 
 This paper focuses on the latter — that is, the carrot-and-stick of industrial policy — in 
relation to FDI. The focus on FDI is important because: 1) FDI is becoming an increasingly 
central part of developing countries’ industrialisation strategies, especially in Ethiopia, and 2) 
among the comparative studies between Ethiopia and the Asian tigers, an analysis of FDI is 
missing.   
FDI inflows to developing countries started becoming visible as early as the 1960s, 
when international companies based in the West sliced up their supply chains in search of low-
cost suppliers. It started with manufacturers offshoring their activities, typified by American 
outsourcing to Mexico (Maquiladoras) and German outsourcing to Central and Eastern Europe, 
by setting up export processing zones (EPZs) for apparel assembly.13 
 Although the motivations for offshoring have largely remained the same to date (i.e. 
the search for cost savings, like cheap labour, land and energy), the scale of offshoring started 
intensifying first in the 1990s, driven by falling transport costs, advances in information and 
communication technology, and lower trade and investment barriers. From 1990 to 2016, FDI 
inflows into developing countries increased from US$35bn to US$646bn, which represents an 
increase from 17 per cent to 37 per cent of world FDI inflows.14 
FDI attraction has therefore become a more central part of economic development and 
industrialisation strategies in developing countries. From a developing country perspective, 
FDI inflows from higher-income countries can yield a number of benefits. In the short term, it 
can boost employment, it can increase foreign exchange and tax revenues, it can assist the 
integration of host countries in the world economy and it can have a positive impact on 
infrastructure development and the business environment.15  
There are also benefits to be derived from FDI attraction that are more long term in 
nature, contributing to the development of productive capabilities and industrialisation of the 
host economy. This happens especially through especially technology transfer, linkages to the 
host economy, competitive pressures on domestic firms and human capital development.16 
 6 
However, these long term benefits are more difficult to achieve than the short term 
benefits. Some would argue that it boils down to the role of industrial policy, and how active 
the state is in utilising foreign investments for the development of domestic productive 
capabilities.17  
The comparative-historical literature on FDI inflows into developing countries broadly 
distinguishes between two regions that have experienced different outcomes: East Asia and 
Latin America.18 
East Asian countries, in particular Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan between 
roughly 1960 and 1990, meticulously designed industrial policies to create backward linkages 
from foreign investors to domestic suppler firms, increase local content, and transfer 
technology from foreign firms to the domestic economy. They did so largely through the 
mechanisms highlighted by Wade and Amsden earlier in this section, tying financial incentives 
to firms with economic performance and local development targets. For example, in Singapore, 
investment incentives designed for foreign firms were often tied to the introduction of higher 
value added operations, training of local staff and the dispatching of Singaporean engineers to 
the headquarters of transnational corporations to acquire new technical skills.19 In South Korea, 
to develop a synthetic fibre industry, the government forced firms to use domestically produced 
fibres, which initially were more expensive and of poorer quality than imported fibres. But in 
return, they gave fibre-using textile firms subsides credit and subsidised their purchase of 
inputs. If the firms met certain export targets, these subsidies became more generous.20 In 
Taiwan, the ‘local content programme’, which focused on linking foreign firms with local 
suppliers through subcontracting practices, became a staple of the country’s FDI-oriented 
industrial policies in the 1970s and 1980s.21 Foreign firms’ links with local producers were 
assisted by proactive industry associations. For example, the electronics industry association 
TEAMA (the Taiwan Electric Appliances Manufacturers’ Association) aggressively recruited 
members from both foreign and local firms with the support of the government.22 
Latin American countries have, on average, been less successful with FDI attraction 
compared to the East Asian countries. The IT cluster in Guadajara, Mexico, is a prime example. 
In the early 1990s, global flaghships of the IT industry, like Hewlett Packard (HP) and 
International Business Machines (IBM), moved massive manufacturing assembly operations 
to Guadalajara, as wages were low and labour unions weak, there was proximity to the US 
market, and tariffs on high tech exports was eventually lowered to zero under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There were initial hopes that local firms would 
evolve into contract manufacturers and suppliers to the US-based transnational corporations, 
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but these hopes were short-lived. Companies like HP and IBM invited contract-manufacturing 
firms based in the US instead, such as Flextronics and Solectron, to co-locate in Guadalajara. 
Up until the early 2000s, when manufacturing assembly operations in the computer industry 
gradually started moving to China, less than 5 per cent of inputs in the Guadalajara cluster had 
been sourced locally. Among the employees of foreign firms in Guadalajara, only 6.9 per cent 
had graduated from high school.23 
Why did the promise of Mexico’s Silicon Valley go unfulfilled? Kevin Gallagher and 
Lyuba Zarsky highlight two reasons. One is the global restructuring and increased international 
competition in the IT industry. The emergence of China as a key player in the global production 
system, with its rare combination of low wages, a huge domestic market, and impressive 
productive capabilities, made it more difficult for Mexico to compete internationally. The 
second is lack of government policies aimed at developing productive capabilities of local 
firms. Mexico’s government failed to put in place incentives for foreign firms to use domestic 
inputs, there was no government-provided development financing for domestic firms, and high 
interest rates choked domestic investments and put upward pressure on the peso, which further 
biased transnational corporations away from using domestic suppliers.24   
The low share of local content in industrial zones primarily destined for exports – often 
known as export processing zones (EPZs) —, such as the IT cluster in Guadalajara, has also 
been the case in El Salvador and Guatemala, where between 3 and 9 per cent of inputs in EPZs 
were purchased locally in the mid to late 1990s.25 For an extreme example, take the Dominican 
Republic. 30 years after the creation of the first EPZ in the country, the average purchase of 
domestic inputs in all EPZs was no more than 0.0001 per cent of the value of all inputs used.26 
While industry specific circumstances and global economic conditions have been factors in 
this outcome, scholars studying these cases have generally emphasised the lack of government 
incentives for foreign firms to use domestic suppliers, or the lack of government policies to 
develop a local supplier industry that could meet international production standards.27  
It will be interesting to see which route the Ethiopian FDI-oriented industrialisation 
strategy will take. Is it proactive enough to avoid leaving the development of productive 
capabilities to the ‘whims’ of foreign firms? If the answer is yes, this does of course not mean 
that this will translate to successful industrialisation in Ethiopia. It is notoriously difficult to 
reduce the causal factors that lead to industrialisation success of any country to just one area 
of policy intervention. What about other policies, like exchange rate policy, industrial 
financing, and the tariff regime? Moreover, many conditions influence success of certain policy 
instruments: is the state apparatus ‘developmental’? Are geographic conditions favourable, 
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such as proximity to targeted consumer markets? In which direction do processes of 
globalisation and the current state of geopolitics influence opportunities for development?  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all these questions. But if Ethiopia gets 
the FDI-oriented industrial policies ‘right’, it is a step in the right direction. And there is a need 
for assessing the direction of these policies, given the importance FDI plays in the Ethiopian 
development model. The remainder of this paper will look at this issue, first through an analysis 
of these policies in Ethiopia, then through a comparative perspective (by drawing on the 
experiences of South Korea and Taiwan).   
 
3. FDI-oriented industrial policy in Ethiopia 
 
3.1 The policy package: mainly export and investment incentives 
 
In Table 1, I have compiled an overview of industrial policy in Ethiopia and the government 
institutions created or revitalised to support industrial policy.28 It shows a committed drive to 
industrialisation, with complimentary policies being coordinated around credit allocation, 

























Several new government agencies have been set up to provide state 
support to prioritized industries more effectively. Examples of such 
institutions include the Ethiopian Investment Commission 
(established in 1992, revitalized in 2014), the Industrial Parks 
Development Corporation, and the Ethiopian Industrial Inputs 
Supply Enterprise. The Prime Minister’s Office has also become 
central in shaping industrial policy. To support light manufacturing 
in a more targeted way, the Ethiopian Textile Industry 
Development Institute (ETIDI) and the Ethiopian Leather Industry 
Development Institute (LIDI) were set up specifically to support 
growth in the textile and leather industries. 
Credit allocation: 
Development 





These are state owned banks that provide subsidized credit to 
prioritised industries. The DBE provides investment capital, 
whereas the CBE provides working capital. 
Export promotion 
Several incentives are in place to encourage exports in prioritized 
industries. These incentives target export-oriented firms, and 
include: reduced interest rates on loans from the DBE and the CBE, 
subsidized leasing of land, subsidized salaries for foreign ‘experts’, 
and tax exemptions. Currency depreciation can also be understood 
as an export promotion instrument.   
FDI attraction 
Several measures have been put in place to attract FDI in 
prioritized industries in order to create employment, generate 
export earnings, and transfer technology. Such measures include 
favourable access to infrastructure (e.g. industrial parks and rail 
transport), tax exemptions, and subsidized land leases (in some 
cases, free land). The Ethiopian Investment Commission is the 




Infrastructure investments, especially power generation and 
transport, are geared towards industrial development. The 
construction of industrial parks, carried out by the Industrial Parks 
Development Corporation, is also an important category of 
infrastructure investments.  
  
 
Source: Author’s compilation from fieldwork 
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The FDI-oriented industrial policies cover more than just the “FDI-attraction” category 
in the table — they can also be found in “infrastructure investments” and “export promotion”. 
Pushing for exports does not only mean easing the balance of payments constraint but it also 
means learning about international markets, striving for higher productivity, and creating more 
jobs than would be possible if only serving the domestic market. Therefore, almost all 
incentives that the government provides to firms (both domestic and foreign) in the 
manufacturing sector are linked to export performance. 
 For some foreign firms, especially big transnationals that typically produce for 
consumer markets in the West, these incentives might simply be interpreted as incentives to 
invest in Ethiopia, as not many of these firms have any intention of selling their products on 
the domestic market anyway. But for other foreign firms, especially early foreign investments 
in textiles and leather products from China and Turkey, export incentives have been important 
because it turned out that many of these firms found it profitable to produce for the Ethiopian 
consumer market.  
In order to attract foreign firms, the construction of industrial parks is a very important 
incentive. Such parks make it easier to concentrate dedicated infrastructure in a limited area, 
and they also normally provide one-stop-shop services to firms — a multitude of logistics 
services efficiently and easily streamlined because of the co-location of many firms.  
 A range of financial incentives has been put in place for export-oriented firms in the 
state-owned parks. As mentioned, these should not simply be seen as export incentives, but 
also as a way of attracting foreign investors. Table 2 presents a full overview of these 
incentives. The list of incentives in the table are not restricted to firms in the state-owned 
industrial parks — in fact, all export-oriented firms in Ethiopia are handed such incentives (and 
in some instances, non-export firms). However, some incentives are offered on a case to case 
basis, while others are offered across the board to all export-oriented firms. For example, 
exemption on duties and taxes on imports are offered to all firms in Ethiopia if used for the 







Table 2: Financial incentives for manufacturing firms in state-owned industrial parks 
  
• Income tax exemption for up to 10 years 
 
• Exemption from duties and other taxes on imports of capital equipment (machinery, 
construction materials, spare parts, vehicles, etc.) and raw materials (inputs needed 
in production, like cotton, yarn and/or fabric). 
   
• No taxes on exports 
 
• One-stop-shop for government services 
 
• Subsidised land lease. 60-80 years free of charge for factories and residential 
quarters. 
 
• Guaranteed remittance of capital for foreign investors 
Source: EIC (2016) 
 
Firms who sell products on the domestic market are also offered duty free access to 
imports, but only on capital equipment, not raw materials, and only for a maximum of five 
years if the investment is not in manufacturing or agriculture.29 Additionally, the exemption of 
export tax is applicable to all exporters, inside and outside of parks. The remittance of capital 
also applies to all foreign investors, regardless of being in – or outside an industrial park.   
 Other incentives are also determined on a case-by-case basis. Subsidised land lease is 
one of them. While there are some guidelines for land lease,30 interviews conducted with 
foreign investors outside industrial parks indicate that the guidelines are not strict. Some 
investors pay for leasing land, while others said that they have been offered to lease large tracts 
of land for free.  From the government’s perspective, lease rates seem to be determined based 
on the desirability of the investment — investors that indicate large-scale investments and/or 
expansion plans with the possibility of creating a lot of jobs seem to be offered more favourable 
lease rates.  
 While these financial incentives are important, Ethiopia is not doing something 
especially novel by offering them. Many of them, such as income tax exemption (also known 
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as ‘tax holidays’) and tax exemption on imports, are offered in industrial parks in many other 
developing countries31 that also have or are still attracting FDI into manufacturing industries.  
 Another important incentive is credit allocation. The state plays an important role in 
capital markets in Ethiopia, as foreign banks are not allowed to operate there (yet). The 
understanding is that they will be allowed in only when domestic banks have developed the 
financial, managerial and technological capacity to compete against international banks. 
Consequently, two state owned banks, the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) and the 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), dominate the banking sector in Ethiopia. DBE is 
important for long-term loans (investment capital), particularly for the manufacturing sector, 
while CBE is responsible for providing working capital and international banking services. 
Their banking services are especially important for domestic firms in both the textile and 
leather industries, as these firms are normally shorter on capital than foreign firms. 
 Policies of a more ‘soft’ nature are also central. The Ethiopian Prime Minister’s Office 
and the Ethiopian Investment Commission stress that their commitment to interacting with 
foreign investors and attracting the ‘right’ type of investments are crucial for success of the 
FDI strategy. For example, the Prime Minster is chair of the National Export Promotion 
Committee, and his office engages directly with foreign investors to see to their needs and 
ensure them that their investments are safe.32 As for the point on attracting the right type of 
investments, the Ethiopian Investment Commission has an explicit strategy of attracting 
investors in different segments of the value chains, so that it increases the probability of 
learning about production activities in more than just the low-value assembly like segments of 
the value chains.33 In the leather industry, FDI has successfully been attracted to both the 
tanning industry and the leather products industry. In the textile industry, FDI from particularly 
Turkey has focused on a range of activities in the value chain. 
 
3.2 Gauging success of the strategy 
 
If we look at success of Ethiopia’s FDI-oriented industrialisation strategy purely in terms of 
attracting FDI, it is clearly successful — manufacturing FDI inflows in the country has 
increased from US$570m in 2007/08 to US$3,712m in 2016/17 (from 2.5 per cent to 5.1 per 
cent of GDP).34 Many of the foreign investors, especially in the light manufacturing industries 
like the textile and leather industries, are coming to Ethiopia to export to consumer markets 
particularly in the West. Therefore, we should also look at manufactured exports as an indicator 
of success. In this area, the trajectory is also positive: From 2004 to 2017, manufactured exports 
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increased from US$21 million to US$389 million (led by exports in the textile and leather 
industries), representing more than a doubling of manufactured goods exports’ share of total 
merchandise exports.35 In the fastest-growing light manufacturing industries — the textile and 
leather industries — foreign firms account for approximately 80 per cent of exports.36 So in 
terms of attracting FDI for the purpose of exporting, the strategy seems to be working.  
 However, as discussed, export success is not enough to ensure the development of 
domestic productive capabilities, and, more broadly, sustained industrialisation. In order to 
proclaim that that the strategy is on the right track, there needs to be some concrete evidence 
that policies are put in place not only to attract foreign investors in manufacturing to increase 
exports but also in order to transfer technology — raising the level of productivity for domestic 
firms by learning about new production techniques and practices, management practices, and 
acquiring knowledge of international markets and trade — and creating linkages (especially 
backward linkages) to the domestic economy. 
 There is some, but not much evidence that such policies have been put in place — 
mostly anecdotal accounts in some interviews of non-governmental facilitated technology 
collaborations between domestic and foreign firms and the formation of supplier relationships 
between domestic and foreign firms.37 Perhaps this is why an official at the Prime Minister’s 
Office expressed the belief that technology transfer would happen through demonstration 
effects — domestic firms being exposed to foreign firms’ products, production processes and 
marketing strategies — and competition effects — the simple presence of foreign firms will 
expose greater pressure on competing domestic firms to be more productive.38 
 The Ethiopian private sector shares the hope that technology will be transferred through 
this channel. When asked in interviews how they saw the entry of foreign firms, most domestic 
firms responded positively, while some took a neutral position. It was a rarity to find domestic 
firms that saw the entry of foreign firms as something ‘bad.’ One reason for the optimism was 
the chance to learn about technologies, management practices and business practices of foreign 
firms. The CEO of one the largest domestic vertically integrated textile firms, whose main 
buyer is H&M, elaborated on this point: 
 
One of the main factors for our success is that buyers are coming to Ethiopia. The foreign 
investments are helping to put Ethiopia on the map. We need foreign companies, as they are 
coming with full technology. Technology transfer will happen through teaching the Ethiopian 
people. They will demonstrate for us, but their competition is also good for us. Leaders, like 
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myself, will be pressured by FDI…My company has the best linen in the country because we 
saw how foreign firms are doing it.39  
  
Moreover, there is some evidence that foreign firms are developing skills of the local workforce 
at higher levels than simple operator training, without the Ethiopian government explicitly 
calling for it. Many investors from East Asia reported that they send Ethiopian workers in 
technical or managerial positions to their home countries for training or train such workers 
through elaborate training programmes at their own facilities in Ethiopia. This is not an act of 
‘benevolence’, as firms simply save money by having a lower dependence on expatriate 
workers. Such a channel of technology transfer has actually been highlighted by Mulu 
Gebreeyesus and Michiko Iizuka as crucial for success in Ethiopia’s cut-flower sector. They 
argue that the entry of foreign firms was vital to knowledge diffusion and skills development 
of the local workforce. This happened without highly interventionist policies to ‘force’ foreign 
firms to transfer technology.  
So there is certainly a chance that some technology can be transferred through simply 
making the investment environment conducive for foreign firms. But even with the 
abovementioned positive signs, foreign firms still account for the majority of manufactured 
exports, and the absolute value of these exports (US$389 million) is very low from a 
comparative perspective.40 The near absence of domestic firms’ participation in international 
markets indicates that little technology transfer has taken place. 
 In terms of backward linkages, while there seems to be some established ties between 
foreign footwear producers and local tanneries41 — partly because raw material is readily 
available — the trend is more worrying in the textile industry. A recent study shows that 
Ethiopia’s import dependency on textile-based products has increased considerably with the 
growth of the apparel industry.42 Linkages between foreign apparel producers and domestic 
fabric producing firms are the exception rather than the rule. In fact, most apparel investors 
coming from abroad say that they intend to import fabric in the foreseeable future.  
 While isolated insights into the case of Ethiopia are useful, gauging the success of 
national policies without a comparative perspective is difficult. The following section will 
therefore look at the experiences of FDI-oriented industrial policy in South Korea and Taiwan 
(whose justifications were explained in the introduction). In section 5, I will draw together all 




4. Lessons from South Korea and Taiwan for FDI-oriented industrial policy 
in Ethiopia 
 
4.1 South Korea: restrictive towards FDI, except for in the textile industry 
 
It may seem surprising to provide South Korea as an example of FDI-oriented industrial policy. 
After all, the country is generally known to have had a restrictive stance towards foreign 
investors. From 1960 to 1990, FDI inflows as a share of total foreign capital inflows (except 
foreign aid) in the country was a mere 5 per cent, among the world’s lowest.43 
 However, while FDI inflows have been low in South Korea, the export-focused textile 
sector is an exception. FDI in the textile sector accounted for 20 per cent of total foreign capital 
in the country in 1974.44 By the mid-1960s, South Korean firms were exporting all sorts of 
apparel, mostly to the Japanese and the US markets, using imported inputs from Japan.45 
 The imported inputs from Japan were crucial for export success of Korean apparel. But 
the way that the relationships were formed, especially through joint ventures, made it easier 
for the Koreans not to simply become stuck with low-value export-oriented assembly tasks. 
Between 1962 and 1974, 52 per cent of Japanese direct investments in South Korea were with 
minority ownership.46 Joint ventures with the Japanese in which Koreans had majority stakes 
more easily facilitated the transfer of technological know-how (learning how to produce 
synthetic fibres was especially important), marketing skills and managerial techniques. 
The Koreans gradually and systematically pushed for less Japanese involvement and a 
higher degree of national firm ownership.47 As soon as practically possible, the Koreans 
invested in their own R&D facilities, and by the early 1980s, they had acquired the capability 
to design their own plants, and had reduced import dependence by developing domestic 
production capabilities in synthetic fibres, petrochemicals, spinning, weaving, dyeing and 
knitting. It is important to emphasise that the development of the Korean textile industry should 
not be understood purely as a means to serve inputs to the apparel industry. Textiles, especially 
synthetic fibres, was (and still is) considered more technologically advanced than apparel, and 
contributed significantly to export earnings in South Korea, especially in light of the high 
protectionist barriers that the US were starting to apply on traditional cotton textiles at the 
time.48 
The role of the state in promoting the development of domestic capabilities in the 
textile-industry in the form of mutually reinforcing import-substitution and export-orientation 
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policies, if you will, cannot be understated. Alice Amsden points out that the import 
substitution of synthetic fibres made the textile industry more productive and less vulnerable 
to devaluations of the exchange rate.49 To compensate domestic fibre-using firms for ‘forcing’ 
on them domestically produced fibres, the Korean government subsidised inputs and handed 
out subsidised credit in return for meeting export performance targets.50 Other important export 
promotion measures included preferential loans for operation and facility expansion, general 
tax and tariff exemptions on some imported inputs and wastage allowances.51 
Another important but often neglected part of the story of South Korea’s export success 
in textiles, apparel and footwear was the attraction of Japanese trading companies. In the early 
1960s, Koreans were simply lacking experience and knowledge of foreign markets, so 
facilitating cooperation with these trading companies proved crucial.52 The trading companies 
were especially important for establishing ties to the US markets. In 1966, Japan accounted for 
82 per cent of the textile, apparel and clothing market in the US, whereas South Korea only 
accounted for 8 per cent. By the early 1970s, the Koreans had made their entry, accounting for 
31 per cent of the US market, whereas the Japanese share had fallen to 52 per cent.53 By this 
time, 50 per cent of South Korea’s exports went to the US.54 
 In conclusion, the story of South Korea’s success with FDI attraction, especially in the 
textile industry, is a story of transferring technological knowhow through joint ventures, 
pushing for increasing local content and international competitiveness through various 
industrial policy tools, especially tariff protection and subsidised credit, and improving access 
to and learning about lucrative export markets through trading companies.   
 
4.2 Taiwan: a heavy focus on promoting local content 
  
Just like in South Korea, the fear of foreign domination of the economy has been pervasive in 
Taiwan: FDI inflows only fluctuated between 4 and 8 per cent as a share of gross fixed capital 
formation between 1960 and 1990. However, 20-25 per cent of manufactured exports came 
from foreign firms in the 1970s.55 
 In the early 1960s, there were plenty of attributes that made Taiwan attractive to foreign 
investors, very similar to those of South Korea. US and Japanese firms were beginning to 
search for low cost labour in nearby countries to relocate production, Taiwan offered political 
stability and disciplined labour, and the country was linked to Japan from the colonial era and 
to the US as an anti-Communist outpost. But the country did a good job in wooing foreign 
investors as well. Among other things, they offered 100 per cent foreign ownership, guarantees 
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against expropriation, and five-year tax holidays. Effort went into making foreign firms feel 
welcome, one common trick being to discover some personal connection between the firm and 
a senior in the Taiwan government.56  
 However, the government has bargained strategically with foreign investors, even in 
the 1960s, when the Taiwanese stance toward foreign investors has been considered relatively 
liberal. A good example of the balancing act that Taiwan mastered between welcoming foreign 
investors and bargaining with them is the polyethylene plant built in the early 1960s by the 
National Distiller and Chemical Corporation (again, a US based firm). To attract the company, 
the Taiwanese government offered a five-year tax holiday, restrictions on imports of 
polyethylene for three years from start-up, guaranteed supplies of ethylene (an input that goes 
into making polyethylene) and unlimited repatriation of profits. The Taiwanese government, 
in return, required that National Distiller should export any surpluses over domestic needs, not 
establish production facilities in downstream sectors, and transfer 50 per cent of shares to 
Chinese nationals after 5 years, so as to make it a 50-50 joint venture.57 The distiller plant 
successfully came on line in 1968.  
 Beginning in the 1970s, the Taiwanese government applied a slightly stricter stance 
toward foreign investors. FDI in labour-intensive production came to be discouraged, it was 
faced with higher export requirements and local content requirements, and limits were placed 
on the extent to which foreign firms could capitalise on their technology – typically demanding 
that technology could not be valued more than 15 per cent of the firm’s equity contribution in 
the case of joint ventures. The intention of this was to make foreign firms commit more equity 
to the project at hand, thereby carrying more of the risk.58 Foreign investors did not always 
comply with the tough bargaining. For example, the Japanese automotive manufacturer, 
Toyota, withdrew from a joint venture in 1984 after concluding that the Taiwanese government 
insisted on too stringent local content requirements and export requirements. Within eight 
years, 50 per cent of cars were to be exported and local content were to rise to 90 per cent.59 
But generally, local content policies in Taiwan have been successful, and the strategy 
of linking foreign firms with local suppliers through subcontracting practices became a staple 
of FDI-oriented industrial policies in Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s.60 Foreign firms’ links 
with local producers were assisted by proactive industry associations. For example, the 
electronics industry association TEAMA (the Taiwan Electric Appliances Manufacturers’ 
Association) aggressively recruited members from both foreign and local firms and, with the 
support of the government, actively promoted the “local content programme.”61 Local 
producers wanted to take advantage of the technology, management skills and sales networks 
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of transnational corporations. And foreign producers stood to benefit from the local content 
programme because it reduced labour costs and lead-times as long as local suppliers met quality 
standards. Consequently, transnational corporations started enthusiastically training local 
technicians, providing technical knowhow and management skills to suppliers and cooperated 
with technical schools on internship programmes.62  
 Also starting in the 1970s, the government became more active in trying to attract R&D 
from foreign companies, especially in high-tech sectors. Incentives included tax write-offs for 
R&D and reductions in taxes on technology imports. Obligations to be met on the foreign firm 
side often involved establishing research departments to train local personnel in advanced 
technology.63 
 In conclusion, the Taiwanese government has applied a range of favourable incentives 
to attract FDI, but has mostly bargained with foreign investors so as to ensure transfer of 
technology and to create backward linkages with domestic suppliers.     
 
5. Is Ethiopia learning from South Korea and Taiwan? Should Ethiopia be 
learning from South Korea and Taiwan?  
 
Despite many similarities between the Ethiopian development model and the East Asian 
development model, it does seem that in both South Korea and Taiwan, the state was more 
proactive in terms of pushing — not to speak of forcing — foreign investors to transfer 
technology to the domestic economy and to create backward linkages from foreign to domestic 
firms.  
 However, in some ways, today’s global economic environment has made such 
proactive industrial policy more difficult. In a world where cheap labour is more easily 
accessible and plentiful than before, transnational corporations can largely pick and choose 
outsourcing locations. For a country like Ethiopia, a non-liberal stance towards foreign 
investors will make it more challenging to attract them. Moreover, the protectionist measures 
that have been important for South Korea and Taiwan are not completely straightforward to 
apply in today’s global trade environment. For example, local content requirements are now 
prohibited by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for most countries. 
 Therefore, Ethiopia’s strategy of simply attracting foreign investors and pushing them 
to export does make some sense. In fact, most countries that have had a liberal stance towards 
foreign investors, regardless of the long-term result on the development of domestic productive 
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capabilities, have been successful in generating export earnings and local employment, 
especially those doing so through building industrial parks (which is Ethiopia’s focus at the 
moment). 
 But the benefits from this type of FDI strategy are limited. The review section in this 
paper highlighted out how Latin American countries have struggled to sustain its 
industrialisation process because foreign investors operated in an enclave economy. Many 
other countries are currently experiencing similar challenges. Malaysia is said to be in a 
middle-income trap because it has not been able to use its FDI attraction for productive-
capability upgrading as much as South Korea and Taiwan have done. And China is still 
struggling to achieve high domestic content in high-technology manufacturing (even though it 
is close to acquiring control over full-fledged global value chains in textiles, apparel, and 
consumer electronics).  
The key point here is that a careful balance needs to be struck between, on the one hand, 
the benefits that a liberal stance towards foreign investors can bring about, and on the other 
hand, the need to develop domestic productive capabilities. For developing countries, this 
especially means pro-active policies to develop backward linkages to the domestic production 
of inputs needed for manufacturing activities and to transfer technology from foreign firms to 
the domestic economy.  
This is what South Korea and Taiwan did so well during their industrialisation period.  
Most importantly, they had an active state that pushed local content requirements and joint 
venture requirements on foreign investors. This is what Ethiopia should look to learn from. But 
we should not forget that South Korea and Taiwan also offered financial incentives to foreign 
investors as a bargaining tool. Ethiopia is already doing this. South Korea and Taiwan had an 
intricate ‘carrot and stick’ strategy with respect to attracting manufacturing FDI. Ethiopia has 
implemented the carrot, but no stick. 
Regarding the question, should Ethiopia learn from South Korea and Taiwan, we could 
also ask if conditions in Ethiopia in the country’s current era of industrialisation compare to 
the initial conditions in South Korea and Taiwan. In fact, many studies on the East Asian 
development experience have stressed the ‘favourable’ conditions under which South Korea 
and Taiwan developed, such as the surging world market demand of the 1950s and the 1960s 
when South Korea and Taiwan started their export drive; the legacy of Japanese colonialism 
which left behind a good base for manufacturing to thrive; and the high level of US aid to South 
Korea and Taiwan due to their strategic importance in the Cold War.64 
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The positive legacy of Japanese colonialism is often highlighted. For example, Tibor 
Scitovsky has pointed out that the Japanese built roads, railways, harbours, and whatever 
beginnings of industry that the two countries had.65 Athul Kohli has emphasised that Japanese 
colonialism was different from European colonial projects in that it developed manufacturing 
industries in its main colonies, i.e. South Korea and Taiwan, which gave them headstarts in 
their subsequent industrialisation.66 
But a conflicting narrative to this story also exists. According Kwan Kim, while 
Japanese colonial rule brought some modernisation, the small infrastructural base built during 
Japanese rule was mostly destroyed during the Korean War of 1950-53.67 In Taiwan, when the 
country was transferred to the Republic of China after World War II, the new administration 
plundered most of the rents, according to Kristin Nordhaug.68 
In fact, many economic indicators suggest that Taiwan and South Korea were in no 
better condition to develop in the 1950s and early 1960s than most low-income countries today, 
like Ethiopia. GDP per capita in both South Korea and Taiwan in 1960 were lower than in 
Ethiopia in 1960 (!), and by far lower than in Ethiopia today, even if measured in constant 
prices.69 Telephone lines in use per 1,000 inhabitants — a common measure of a country’s 
level of infrastructure development — was lower than 10 in both South Korea and Taiwan in 
1960, similar to most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa at that time. Per capita value added in 
manufacturing in the 1950s in South Korea and Taiwan was on par with most countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa at that time, and far below that of most countries in Latin America.70 Nor did 
the state of private sector development indicate that a massive capitalist transformation would 
take place. In the 1950s, state-owned enterprises produced more than 50 per cent of total 
manufacturing output in South Korea and Taiwan, higher than Ethiopia in 2004.71 
What about supporting institutions for industrial development? The evidence is mixed. 
In a recent paper, Ha-Joon Chang and I compare Ethiopia’s current state apparatus for 
industrialisation with that of South Korea and Taiwan during their growth experiences.72 We 
present evidence suggesting that the Ethiopian state shares many features with the original 
developmental states in East Asia, such as a developmental orientation committed to 
industrialisation, and the state’s heavy governing power in the private sector. But we point out 
that the Ethiopian bureaucracy is weaker and less independent from everyday politics than 
those of the East Asian developmental states between 1960 and 1990. So even though there 
has been an expansion of the industrial bureaucracy in Ethiopia, such as the establishment of 
sectoral support institutes and linkage creation institutes (see Table 1), most of the real decision 
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making power lies in the hands of the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF). 
 However, our arguments could certainly be criticised on some points. For example, 
early in their development trajectories (in the late 1950s and the early 1960s), the bureaucracy 
and supporting institutions in South Korea and Taiwan were also closely tied to politics. For 
example, in 1963, the chief of the Economic Planning Board in South Korea (arguably the most 
central organ in industrial policy-making) was also Deputy Prime Minister.73 Robert Wade 
argues that the idea of an independent and powerful economic bureaucracy was more fitting of 
Japan than the other ‘developmental’ states. In Taiwan, he explains, the president and premier 
had much more control over the policy-making apparatus than in Japan.74 
The key takeaway point from this comparison about initial conditions is that we should 
be careful to conclude that South Korea and Taiwan were better placed to develop 
economically in 1960 than Ethiopia has been for the past decade (and other low-income 
countries too, for that matter). Ex ante, not many people predicted the rapid industrialisation of 
South Korea and Taiwan. Ex post, it is easy to be deterministic about various initial conditions. 
Too many scholars have highlighted East Asian ‘exceptionalism’ to explain their development 
experiences. If we go down to the last detail, every successful development experience is 
unique, but this does not mean that there is nothing to learn from these experiences.         
While this article stresses that Ethiopia should look to learn more from South Korea 
and Taiwan, this does not mean that Ethiopia should not or cannot learn from other 
development experiences. Some scholars highlight China as an additional comparison that is 
useful for Ethiopia.75 From the perspective of successfully attracting FDI, this is not at all 
surprising. From the 1990s onwards, China has become one of the world’s largest recipients of 
manufacturing FDI, and successfully managed to create linkages between foreign firms and 
domestic suppliers, at least in low-tech industries.76  
China has actually played a crucial role in Ethiopia’s industrialisation process, mainly 
through being the largest provider of external finance (through concessional loans) for 
infrastructure development. China has also been an important player in the rise of FDI in 
Ethiopia, particularly in the leather industry. The business relationship between the two 
countries in this industry started in 2011, when Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, sent 
a trade mission to China to invite potential footwear manufacturers to invest in Ethiopia 
(curiously on invitation from then-World Bank chief economist, Justin Lin).77 One firm, 
Huijian, visited Ethiopia later that year and decided to set up a factory. The firm started 
production in 2012, and is now Ethiopia’s largest exporter of leather footwear. The success of 
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this particular company partly explains why Ethiopia has been successful in attracting more 
Chinese companies in the leather industry, who dominate this particular industry. 
In conclusion, it is not surprising to see comparisons between Ethiopia, South Korea 
and Taiwan. Ethiopia, like South Korea and Taiwan, is focusing heavily on industrialisation 
and has already implemented an impressive array of industrial policy tools (see Table 1) that 
are showing promise for economic development. The push for exports through a financial 
incentive scheme is also similar to that of South Korea and Taiwan. But with respect to FDI-
oriented industrial policy, Ethiopia could benefit from taking even more lessons from the long-
term economic development perspective of South Korea and Taiwan. In these countries, the 
state was more proactive in terms of pushing foreign investors to transfer technology to the 
domestic economy and to create backward linkages from foreign to domestic firms.  
This does not mean that if Ethiopia gets FDI-oriented industrial policy ‘right’, the 
country will achieve the same level of economic success as South Korea and Taiwan. The set 
of policies in successful industrialisation experiences was highly complex, and involved many 
more considerations than FDI. Moreover, each country faces unique challenges. In Ethiopia, 
these challenges go beyond getting just the policies right. As recent ethnic-based protests and 
the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn show, the state-led development 
project is somewhat fragile,78 even with the instalment of the new Prime Minister, Abiy 
Ahmed, for whom expectations are high. In its industrialisation plans, the Ethiopian 
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